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Abstract. Blind signatures play an important role in both electronic
cash and electronic voting systems. Blind signatures should be secure
against various attacks (such as signature forgeries). The work puts a
special attention to secret key exposure attacks, which totally break dig-
ital signatures. Signatures that resist secret key exposure attacks are
called forward secure in the sense that disclosure of a current secret key
does not compromise past secret keys. This means that forward-secure
signatures must include a mechanism for secret-key evolution over time
periods.
This paper gives a construction of the first blind signature that is forward
secure. The construction is based on the SIS assumption in the lattice
setting. The core techniques applied are the binary tree data structure
for the time periods and the trapdoor delegation for the key-evolution
mechanism.
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Cryptography, SIS Assumption
1 Introduction
Key exposure is one of most serious dangers for both secret and public key cryp-
tography. When secret keys are disclosed, cryptographic systems using them are
completely broken. Fortunately, there are some solutions that can be used to
mitigate secret-key exposure. They are summarized in [6]. Among many possi-
ble solutions, forward security seems to be the most promising when trying to
minimize a damage caused by secret-key disclosure.
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For cryptographic protocols, forward security guarantees that even if the
current session key is compromised by an adversary, she gets no information
about previous session keys. This means that past sessions are still secure. The
notion of forward security has been coined by Gu¨nther in [15] and later used in
[12] to evaluate security of authenticated key-exchange protocols. Note that the
authors of [12] and [15] call it forward secrecy. Ross Anderson in [5] extends the
notion for digital signatures.
Blind signatures, introduced by Chaum [10], allow users to obtain message
signatures from a signer without leaking information about message contents.
Blind signatures are indispensable in many applications such as electronic cash
[23, Section 1] and electronic voting protocols [18]. For such security-critical ap-
plications, one would expect blind signatures to be resistant against key disclo-
sure. An obvious solution is to incorporate forward security into blind signatures.
There are many works such as [11,13,17] that follow this line of investigation.
All solutions published so far rely on number-theoretic assumptions and conse-
quently are insecure against quantum adversaries.
Related Works. Bellare and Milner investigate secret-key exposure of digital
signatures in their Crypto99 paper [6]. They formulate a security model and
define forward-secure digital signatures. They also design their forward-secure
signature assuming intractability of integer factorization. Abdalla and Reyzin
[1], and Itkis and Reyzin [16] improve efficiency the Bellare-Miner signature.
The work of Duc et al. [13] is the first, which investigates forward security in the
context of blind signatures. The authors of [13] adopt the definition and security
model from [6] to forward-secure blind signatures. Their blind signature provides
forward-secure unforgeability assuming intractability of the strong RSA problem
and access to random oracle. Their security proof exploits the forking lemma by
Pointcheval and Stern [23]. Later, Chow et al. [11] design forward-secure blind
signature using bilinear pairings. Jia et al. [17] describe a forward-secure blind
signature that is also based on bilinear pairings. Boyd and Gellert [7] give a
comprehensive survey of methods of incorporating forward security to different
cryptographic primitives. They also unify different approaches to forward secu-
rity by generalising the notion and its terminology.
Our Contributions and Approach. Thanks to its quantum resistance, lattice-
based cryptography is attracting more and more attention from the research
community. However, there is no lattice-based construction of forward-secure
blind signatures. Our work fills the gap. We construct the first forward-secure
blind signature in the lattice setting. Forward security is proven in the random
oracle model assuming intractability of the average case of short integer solution
(SIS). We also use the rewinding (forking lemma) argument.
Inspired by the works [19,24,25], our signature is designed using the 3-move
Fiat-Shamir transformation. To achieve blindness, the rejection sampling tech-
nique is applied (see Section 2). Thus, an extra move is needed to ensure that
a final signature is valid. In order to achieve forward security, we exploit both a
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binary tree structure for lattice-based schemes introduced in [9] and a trapdoor
delegation from [2,9].
To obtain forward-secure signature, we need a mechanism that permits for a
secret-key update between two time intervals. For this purpose, we use a binary
tree of the depth ℓ, whose leaves are labelled from left to right by consecutive
time intervals t = 0 up to t = τ − 1, where τ = 2ℓ is the total number of time
intervals. To generate the public key and the initial secret key, we choose random
matrices A
(0)
j , A
(1)
j for j ∈ [ℓ] together with a matrix/trapdoor pair (A0, TA0).
Now, for any node w(i) = (w1, · · · , wi) ∈ {0, 1}i, we build up a concatenated
matrix of form Fw(i) = [A0‖A(w1)1 ‖A(wi)i ]. Then, we can compute a trapdoor for
Λ⊥q (Fw(i)) using TA0 . If the node w
(k) is the ancestor of the node w(i), then we
can obtain a trapdoor for Λ⊥q (Fw(i)) from a trapdoor for Λ
⊥
q (Fw(k)). However,
one cannot get a trapdoor for Λ⊥q (Fw(k)) from a trapdoor of Λ
⊥
q (Fw(i)). This is
the main idea behind the key evolution (key update) mechanism.
2 Preliminaries
For a positive integer ℓ, [ℓ] stands for the set {1, · · · , ℓ}. For a vector c and a
matrix S, c[i] and S[i] represent the i-th element of c and the i-th column of S,
respectively.
Lattices. Integer lattices are discrete subgroups of Zm. Formally, a lattice L in
Z
m is defined as L = L(B) := {∑ni=1 bixi : xi ∈ Z, ∀i = 1, · · · , n} ⊆ Zm, where
B = [b1, · · · ,bn] ∈ Zm×n is called a basis of L, and bi’s are column vectors. We
call n the rank of L. We say L is a full rank lattice if n = m.
Given a matrix A ∈ Zn×m and a vector u ∈ Znq , we define two lattices:
Λ⊥q (A) := {e ∈ Zm s.t. Ae = 0 mod q} ,
Λuq (A) := {e ∈ Zm s.t. Ae = u mod q} .
They all are full rank lattices containing qZm and are called q-ary lattices. Note
that if v ∈ Λuq (A), then Λuq (A) = Λ⊥q (A) + v.
For a set of vectors S = {s1, · · · , sk} in Rm, we denote ‖S‖ := maxi ‖si‖.
Also, S˜ := {s˜1, · · · , s˜k} stands for the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of the
vectors s1, · · · , sk in that order. The Gram-Schmidt norm of S is denoted by
‖S˜‖. A basis of a lattice is called short if its Gram-Schmidt norm is short.
We recall the shortest independent vectors problem (SIVP), which is the
worst case of approximation problem on lattices. Note that the i-th minimum of a
n-dimensional lattice L is defined as λi(L) := min{r : dim(span(L∩Bn(0, r))) ≥
i}, where Bn(0, r) = {x ∈ Rn : ‖x‖ ≤ r}.
Definition 1 (SIVP). Given a full-rank basis B of an n-dimensional lattice L.
SIVPγ requires to output a set of n linearly independent lattice vectors S ⊂ L(B)
such that ‖S‖ ≤ γ(n) · λn(L(B)).
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Below we define discrete Gaussian distribution over an integer lattice.
Definition 2 (Gaussian Distribution). Let Λ ⊆ Zm be a lattice. For a vector
v ∈ Rm and a positive parameter s ∈ R, define ρs,v(x) = exp
(
−π‖x−v‖2s2
)
and
ρs,v(Λ) =
∑
x∈Λ ρs,v(x). The discrete Gaussian distribution over Λ with center
v and parameter σ is ∀y ∈ Λ,DΛ,s,v(y) = ρs,v(y)ρs,v(Λ) .
For convenience, ρs and DΛ.s denote ρ0,s and DΛ,s,0, respectively. When
s = 1, we will write ρ instead of ρ1. Also, Dms,v and Dms stand for DZm,s,v and
DZm,s, respectively.
Lemma 1 ( [21, Lemma 4.5]). For any v ∈ Zm, if s = α · ‖v‖, where α > 0,
we have Pr
[
Dms (x)/Dms,v(x) ≤ e12/α+1/(2α
2) : x← Dms
]
≥ 1− 2−100.
Remark 1. In Lemma 1, if α = 12, i.e., s = 12‖v‖ then Dms (x)/Dms,v(x) ≤
e1+1/288 with probability not smaller than 1− 2−100.
Trapdoors and Trapdoor Delegation. Alwen and Peikert [4] give an algo-
rithm for sampling a uniform matrix A ∈ Zn×mq together with a short basis TA
for Λ⊥q (A). It is an improvement of the algorithm published by Ajtai in [3]. We
call TA an associated trapdoor for A or for Λ
⊥
q (A).
Theorem 1 ([4]). Let q ≥ 3 be odd and m := ⌈6n log q⌉. There is a proba-
bilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm TrapGen(q, n) that outputs a pair (A ∈
Z
n×m
q , TA ∈ Zm×m) such that A is statistically close to a uniform matrix in
Z
n×m
q and TA is a basis for Λ
⊥
q (A) satisfying ‖T˜A‖ ≤ O(
√
n log q) and ‖TA‖ ≤
O(n log q) with all but negligible probability in n.
Regarding Gaussian distribution, q-ary lattices and trapdoors, some useful re-
sults are presented in the following lemma and theorem.
Lemma 2 ([14, Corollary 5.4]). Let m,n, q be positive integers such that q is
prime and m ≥ 2n log q . Then for all but 2q−n fraction of all matrix A ∈ Zn×mq
and for any s ≥ ω(√logm), the distribution of u := Ae (mod q) is statisti-
cally close to uniform over Znq , where e ← DZm,s. Furthermore, the conditional
distribution of e← DZm,s, given Ae = u (mod q), is exactly DΛuq(A),s.
Theorem 2. Let q > 2 and let A,B be a matrix in Zn×mq with m > n. Let
TA, TB be a basis for Λ
⊥
q (A) and Λ
⊥
q (B), respectively. Then the following state-
ments are true.
1. [22, Lemma 4.4] For s ≥ ‖T˜A‖ · ω(
√
logn), we have
Pr[x← DΛuq (A),s : ‖x‖ > s
√
m] ≤ negl(n).
2. [14, Theorem 4.1] There is a PPT algorithm SampleD(B, s,v) that, given
a basis B of an n-dimensional lattice Λ := L(B), a parameters s ≥ ‖B˜‖ ·
ω(
√
logn) and a center v ∈ Rn, outputs a sample from a distribution statis-
tically close to DΛ,s,v.
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3. [14, Subsection 5.3.2] There is a PPT algorithm SampleISIS(A, TA, s,u) that,
on input a matrix A, its associated trapdoor TA, a Gaussian parameter s ≥
‖T˜A‖ · ω(
√
logn) and a given vector u, outputs a vector e from DΛuq(A),s.
It performs as follows: first it chooses an arbitrary t ∈ Zm satisfying that
At = u (mod q) (t exists for all but an at most q−n fraction of A). It
then samples w ← DΛ⊥q (A),s using SampleD(TA, s,−t) and finally outputs
e = t+w.
4. [19, Section 2] There is a PPT algorithm SampleKey(A, TA, s,K) that takes
as input a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , its associated trapdoor TA ∈ Zm×mq , a real
number s ≥ ‖T˜A‖ · ω(
√
logn) and matrix K ∈ Zn×kq to output a random
(column) matrix S ∈ Zm×k such that the j-th column S[j] ∈ Dom := {e ∈
Z
m : ‖e‖ ≤ s√m} for all j ∈ [k] and that A · S = K (mod q) with over-
whelming probability. The distribution of S is DZm×k,s statistically close to
the uniform distribution over Domk. It performs by calling k times the algo-
rithm SampleISIS(A, TA, s,u) in which u = K[j] for j ∈ {1, · · · , k}.
In order to securely delegate a basis for an extended lattice, one can call the
ExtBasis algorithm described below.
Lemma 3 ([2, Theorem 5]). Let A := [A1‖A2‖A3] be a concatenation of
three matrices A1, A2, A3. Suppose that TA2 is a basis of Λ
⊥
q (A2). Then, there is
a deterministic polynomial time algorithm ExtBasis(A, TA2) that outputs a basis
TA for Λ
⊥
q (A) such that ‖T˜A‖ = ‖T˜A2‖.
Hardness Assumption. Forward-security of our construction is proven assum-
ing hardness of the SIS problem.
Definition 3 (l2-SISq,n,m,β problem, [21, Definition 3.1]). Given a random
matrix A ←$ Zn×mq , find a vector z ∈ Zm \ {0} such that Az = 0 (mod q) and
‖z‖ ≤ β.
The hardness of l2-SIS is stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 3 ([14, Proposition 5.7]). For any poly-bounded m, β = poly(n)
and for any prime q ≥ β · ω(√n logn), the average case problem l2 − SISq,n,m,β
is as hard as approximating the SIVP problem (among others) in the worst case
for a factor γ = β · O˜(√n).
Define the SISq,n,m,d distribution by the pair (A,As), where A
$←− Zn×mq and
s
$←− {−d, · · · , 0, · · · , d} are chosen at random. The distribution is characterised
by the following lemma.
Lemma 4 (Discussed in [21]). For d ≫ qm/n, the SISq,n,m,d distribution is
statistically close to uniform over Zn×mq × Znq . Given (A,u) from the SISq,n,m,d
distribution, there are many possible solutions s satisfying As = u.
Rejection Sampling. This is an aborting technique that is frequently used in
lattice-based cryptography. The technique plays an important role in guarantee-
ing the blindness as well as it is used in simulation of the forward-security proof
for our signature.
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Lemma 5 (Rejection Sampling, [21, Theorem 4.6]). Let V = {v ∈ Zm :
‖v‖ ≤ δ} be a subset of Zm and s = ω(δ log√m) be a real number. Define a
probability distribution h : V → R. Then there exists a universal M = O(1)
satisfying that two algorithms A and B defined as:
1. (A): v← h, z← Dmv,s, output (z,v) with probability min( D
m
s (z,)
MDm
v,s(z)
, 1), and
2. (B): v← h, z← Dms , output (z,v) with probability 1/M ,
have a negligible statistical distance ∆(A,B) := 2−ω(logm)/M . Moreover, the
probability that A outputs something is at least (1−2−ω(logm))/M . In particular,
if s = αδ for any α > 0, then M = e12/α+1/(2α
2), ∆(A,B) = 2−100/M and the
probability that A outputs something is at least (1− 2−100)/M .
Commitment Functions. A commitment function com maps a pair of two
strings (µ,d) ∈ {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}n (called committed string) to a commitment
string C := com(µ,d) ∈ {0, 1}n. We need com that is both statistically hiding
and computationally binding. For more details, see [24], [19].
3 Framework of Forward-secure Blind Signatures
In this section, we recap the syntax and the security model for forward-secure
blind signatures (FSBS). We follow [13], which is in turn adapted from [6].
3.1 Syntax of Forward-secure Blind Signature Schemes
A forward-secure blind signature (or FSBS for short) consists of the four algo-
rithms Setup, KeyUp, Sign, and Verify. They are described as follows:
– (pp, pk, sk0)
$←− Setup(1n). The algorithm is a PPT one that takes as input
a security parameter n and generates common parameters pp, a public key
pk and an initial secret key skǫ.
– skt+1
$←− KeyUp(skt, t): The key update algorithm is a PPT one, which
derives a secret key skt+1 for the time period t+1 from a secret key skt for
a time period t. After execution, the algorithm deletes the secret key skt.
– (V , Σ) $←− Sign(pp, pk, skt, t, µ): The signing algorithm involves an interaction
between a user, say U(pp, pk, t, µ) and a signer, say S(pp, pk, skt, t). At a time
period t, the user blinds the message µ using the secret key skt and sends
it to the signer. The signer replies with a signature of the blinded message.
After successful interactions, the user obtains a signature Σ of the original
message µ at the time t. The signer gets its own view V . If the interaction
fails, the user and signer output Σ := ⊥ and V := ⊥, respectively.
– 1/0 := Verify(pp, pk, t, µ,Σ): The verification algorithm is a deterministic
one that outputs either 1 if Σ is non-⊥ and valid or 0, otherwise. As the
input, it accepts a parameter pp, a public key pk, a time period t, a message
µ and a signature Σ.
Lattice Blind Signatures with Forward Security 7
The correctness of FSBS is defined as follows. For any (pp, pk, sk0)← Setup(1n)
and (Σ,V) ← Sign(pp, pk, sk, t, µ), the verification algorithm fails with a negli-
gible probability or
Pr[Verify(pp, pk, t, µ,Σ) = 1] = 1− negl(n).
3.2 Security of Forward-secure Blind Signatures
Two properties required for forward-secure blind signatures are blindness and
forward security. Blindness ensures that it is impossible for the signer to learn
any information about messages being signed.
Definition 4 (Blindness). FSBS is blind if for any efficient algorithm S∗, the
advantage of S∗ in the blindness game BlindS∗FSBS is negligible. That is
AdvBlindFSBS(S∗) := Pr[BlindS
∗
FSBS ⇒ 1]− 1/2 ≤ negl(n).
FSBS is called perfectly blind if Pr[BlindS
∗
FSBS ⇒ 1] is exactly 1/2.
The blindness game BlindS
∗
FSBS consists of three phases defined below.
1. Initialization. The adversary S∗ chooses a security parameter n, then ob-
tains common parameters pp, a public key pk and an initial secret key sk0
using Setup(1n).
2. Challenge. S∗ selects and gives the challenger C two messages µ0 and µ1.
The challenger C flips a coin b ∈ {0, 1} and initiates two signing interactions
with S∗ on input µb and µ1−b (not necessarily in two different time periods).
The adversary S∗ acts as the signer in these two interactions and finally
attains two corresponding view/signature pairs (Vb, Σb) and (V1−b, Σ1−b).
3. Output. The adversary S∗ outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1}. It wins if b′ = b.
Following [13], we define forward-security as the forward-secure unforgeability.
In the FSUFU
∗
FSBS game, the forger U∗ is a malicious user (adversary).
Definition 5 (Forward-secure Unforgeability). FSBS is forward-secure un-
forgeable (FSUF) if for any efficient algorithm U∗, the advantage of U∗ in the
forward-secure unforgeability game FSUFU
∗
FSBS is negligible. That is,
AdvFSUFFSBS(U∗) := Pr[FSUFU
∗
FSBS ⇒ 1] ≤ negl(n).
In our work, the forward-secure unforgeability game FSUFU
∗
FSBS in defined in
the random oracle model. (We use hashing as an instantiation of random oracle.)
We assume that, whenever the adversary wants to make a signing query, it always
makes a random oracle query in advance.
1. Setup. The forger U∗ gives a security parameter n to the challenger C.
The challenger C generates system parameters pp and outputs the key pair
(pk, sk0) by calling Setup(1
n). Then C sends pp and pk to the forger U∗. The
key sk0 is kept secret.
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2. Queries. At a time period t, the forger U∗ can make a polynomially many
random oracle queries as well as a polynomially many signing queries in an
adaptive manner. In order to move to the next time period, the forger makes
a key update query to get the secret key skt+1 for the time period t+1. Note
that, once the forger makes a key update query, i.e., it obtains the secret
key skt+1, it cannot issue random oracle and signing queries for past time
intervals. Finally, the forger is allowed to make a single break-in query at
a time period t ≤ T − 1, when it wants to stop the query phase. The time
interval t is called the break-in time. Once the forger makes the break-in
query, it is not able to make further random oracle (or hash) and signing
queries. Details of the challenger actions in response to the forger queries are
given below.
– For key update query KQ(t): if t < T − 1, then the challenger updates
the secret key skt to skt+1 and updates t to t+1. If t = T − 1 then skT
is given as an empty string.
– For each hash queries HQ(t, µ): the challenger has to reply with a ran-
dom value.
– For each signing query SQ(t, µ): the challenger must send a valid signa-
ture back to U∗.
– For the break-in query BQ(t) (note that the query is allowed once only):
the challenger must send the secret key skt to the adversary and move
the game to the output phase.
3. Output. U∗ outputs at least one forgery (µ∗, t∗, Σ∗) at time period t∗. He
wins the game if t∗ < t, SQ(t∗, µ∗) has been never queried, and (µ∗, t∗, Σ∗)
is valid.
4 Our Construction
4.1 Binary Tree Hierarchy for Time Periods
Our design applies a binary-tree data structure. In the context of encryption,
binary trees have been introduced by [8]. For the lattice setting, they have
been adapted by Cash et al. in [9]. The tree structure is useful for construct-
ing forward-secure public key encryption schemes [8], HIBE [9] and recently for
forward-secure group signature [20]. We need time periods t ∈ {0, · · · , 2ℓ− 1} to
be assigned to leaves of a binary tree of the depth ℓ. The tree leaves are arranged
in increasing order from left to right – see Figure 1. For a time period t, there
is a unique path t = (t1, · · · , tℓ) from the root ǫ to the leaf, where for each level
i ∈ [ℓ], ti = 0 if this is the left branch or ti = 1 if this is the right branch. Conse-
quently, the i-th level node w(i) in the binary tree can be described by a unique
binary bit string w(i) = (w1, · · · , wi) that follows the path from the root to the
node. This means that for the node w(i) = (w1, · · · , wi), we can create a corre-
sponding matrixWt = [A0‖A(w1)1 ‖ · · · ‖A(wi)i ] (resp., Ft = [A0‖A(t1)1 ‖ · · · ‖A(tℓ)ℓ ]),
where A0 and its ascociated trapdoor TA0 are generated by TrapGen and A
(b)
i
are random matrices for all i ∈ [ℓ], b ∈ {0, 1}.
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Updating secret keys from time period t to t + 1 is done by the trapdoor
delegation mechanism using ExtBasis. Each node w(i) = (w1, · · · , wi) is associ-
ated with a secret key Tw(i) , which can be computed from the initial secret key
sk0 = TA0 by evaluating
Tw(i) ← ExtBasis(Aw(i) , TA0), where Aw(i) =
[
A0‖A(w1)1 ‖A(w2)2 ‖ · · · ‖A(wi)i
]
.
Tw(i) is easily computed if a secret key Tw(k) for an ancestor w
(k) of w(i) is known.
Assume that the binary representation ofw(i) is w(i) = (w1, · · · , wk, wk+1, · · · , wi),
where k < i. Then
Tw(i) ← ExtBasis(Aw(i) , Tw(k)), where Aw(i) =
[
A0‖A(w1)1 ‖ · · · ‖A(wk)2 ‖ · · · ‖A(wi)i
]
.
Similarly, a secret key for a time period (i.e., a leaf) can be computed if we have
any its ancestor’s secret key.
4.2 Description of the Proposed Signature
Our lattice-based forward-secure blind signature (FSBS) consists of a setup al-
gorithm Setup, a key update algorithm KeyUp, an interactive signing algorithm
Sign and a verification algorithm Verify. They all are described below. Note that,
we also use a commitment function com.
Setup(1n, 1ℓ): For a security parameter n and a binary tree depth ℓ, the algo-
rithm runs through the following steps.
– Choose q = poly(n) prime, m = O(n log q), k, κ, ℓ, τ = 2ℓ, σ, σ1, σ2, σ3
(see Section 5.4 for details).
– Let M = {0, 1}∗ be the message space of the scheme.
– Choose randomly a matrixK
$←− Zn×kq . Similarly, select matricesA(0)1 , A(1)1 ,
A
(0)
2 , A
(1)
2 , · · · , A(0)ℓ , A(1)ℓ from Zn×mq at random.
– Run TrapGen(q, n) to obtain a pair (A0, TA0), where A0 ∈ Zn×mq and
TA0 ∈ Zm×m are a matrix and its associated trapdoor.
– Let H : {0, 1}∗ →RH be a collision-resistant and one-way hash function,
where RH := {e′ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}k : ‖e′‖ ≤ κ}.
– Let com : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a computationally binding and
statistically hiding commitment function.
– Output pp← {n, q,m, ℓ, τ, k, κ, σ, σ1, σ2, σ3,M, H, com}, pk ← {A0, A(0)1 ,
A
(1)
1 , · · · , A(0)ℓ , A(1)ℓ ,K}, and skǫ ← TA0 as common parameters, public
key and the initial secret key, respectively.
KeyUp(pp, pk, skt, t): We need a key evolution mechanism (KVM) that “forgets”
all secret keys of internal nodes that can produce past keys. Additionally, we
expect that KVM stores the smallest number of keys necessary for signature
to work properly. The key evolution mechanism KVM works as follows.
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– For any leaf t, define the minimal cover Node(t) to be the smallest subset
of nodes that contains an ancestor of all leaves in {t, · · · , T −1} but does
not contain any ancestor of any leaf in {0, · · · , t − 1}. For example, in
Figure 1, Node(0) = {ǫ}, Node(1) = {001, 01, 1}, Node(2) = {01, 1},
Node(3) = {011, 1} (i.e., two black circles in the tree), Node(4) = {1},
Node(5) = {101, 11}, Node(6) = {11}, Node(7) = {111}.
– The secret key skt at time period t contains secret keys correspond-
ing to all nodes (including leaves) in Node(t). For example, for the tree
from Figure 1, we have sk0 = skǫ = {TA0}, sk1 = {T001, T01, T1}, where
T001, T01, and T1 are associated trapdoors for F001 = [A0‖A(0)1 ‖A(0)2 ‖A(1)3 ],
F01 = [A0‖A(0)1 ‖A(1)2 ] and F1 = [A0‖A(1)1 ], respectively.
– To update skt to skt+1, the signer determines the minimal cover Node(t+
1), then derives keys for all nodes in Node(t+1)\Node(t) using the keys
in skt as described in Section 4.1. Finally the signer deletes all keys in
Node(t) \Node(t+ 1). For example, sk2 = {T01, T1} (mentioned above),
since Node(2) \ Node(1) = {01, 1} and Node(1) \ Node(2) = {001}.
ǫ
0
00
000 001
01
010 011
1
10
100 101
11
110 111
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5 t = 6 t = 7
level 0
level 1
level 2
level 3
Fig. 1. Binary tree of depth ℓ = 3, i.e., for τ = 8 time periods. The root is denoted by
ǫ. For convenience, we name nodes by their binary representations
Sign(pp, pk, skt, t, µ): The signer interacts with the user in order to produce a
signature for a message µ ∈M at time period t. The interaction consists of
five phases. Phases 1,3 and 5 are done by the signer. Phases 2 and 4 – by
the user.
– Phase 1 : The signer constructs the matrix Ft =
[
A0‖A(t1)1 ‖ · · · ‖A(tℓ)ℓ
]
∈
Z
n×(ℓ+1)m
q for the time t = (t1, · · · , tℓ). Next it computes an ephemeral
secret key St using SampleKey described in Theorem 2, where Ft ·St = K.
Note that St can be computed at Phase 3 as well. The signer samples
r ∈ Z(ℓ+1)m according to the distribution D(ℓ+1)mσ2 . It finally computes
and sends x = Ftr ∈ Znq to the user.
– Phase 2 : Upon receiving x, the user samples blind factors a← D(ℓ+1)mσ3
and b← Dkσ1 , d′
$←− {0, 1}n. It computes u = x+ Fta+Kb and hashes
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it with c := com(µ,d′) ∈ {0, 1}n using the hash function H to obtain a
real challenge e′. The rejection sampling technique is called to get the
blinded challenge e, which is sent back to the user.
– Phase 3 : The ephemeral secret key St and r are used to compute z =
r + Ste. In order to guarantee that no information of St is leaked, the
rejection sampling is applied, which implies that the distribution of z
and r are the same. Finally, the blinded signature z is delivered to the
user.
– Phase 4 : The user computes the unblinded signature z′ = z+ a. Again,
the rejection sampling is called to make sure that z′ and z are indepen-
dent of each other and z′ is bounded in some desired domain. The user re-
turns (t, µ,Σ = (d′, e′, z′)) as the final signature if ‖z′‖ ≤ σ3
√
(1 + ℓ)m
holds. Otherwise, he outputs “⊥”. The user is required to confirm valid-
ity of the final signature by sending result to the signer: result := accept
means the final signature is good, while result := (a,b, e′, c)) requires
the user to restart the signing protocol.
– Phase 5 : Having obtained result, the signer checks whether or not result 6=
accept. If not, it returns the view V = (t, r, e, z). Otherwise it makes some
check-up operations before restarting the signing algorithm. The check-
up allows the signer to detect an adversary who controls the user and
tries to forge a signature.
Note that the rejection sampling in Phase 2 is not able restart the signing
algorithm as it is used locally. In contrast, the rejection sampling in Phase 3
and Phase 4 can make the signing algorithm restart. The reader is referred
to Section 5 for more details. Figure 2 illustrates the signing algorithm.
Verify(t, pk, µ,Σ): The algorithm accepts a signature Σ on the message µ for
the time period t = (t1, · · · , tℓ) and public key pk as its input and performs
the following steps:
(i) parse Σ = (d′, e′, z′);
(ii) form Ft :=
[
A0‖A(t1)1 ‖ · · · ‖A(tℓ)ℓ
]
∈ Zn×(1+ℓ)m;
(iii) compute ê := H(Ftz
′ −Ke′ mod q, com(µ,d′));
(iv) if ‖z′‖ ≤ σ3
√
(1 + ℓ)m and ê = e′, then output 1, otherwise return 0.
5 Correctness, Security and Parameters for FSBS
5.1 Correctness
Theorem 4 (Correctness). The correctness of FSBS scheme holds after at
most e2 restarts with probability not smaller than 1− 2−100.
Proof. Given (t, µ,Σ = (d′, e′, z′)) produced by Sign(pp, pk, skt, µ) – see Figure
2. It is east to show that H(Ftz
′ − Ke′ (mod q), com(µ,d′)) = e′. Note that
‖z′| ≤ σ3
√
(1 + ℓ)m with overwhelming probability by Statement 1 of Theorem
2. Remark 1 implies that if s = 12‖c‖, then Dms (x)M·Dms,c(x) ≤
e1+1/288
M with probability
at least 1−2−100. The rejection sampling requires that Dms (x)/(M ·Dms,c(x)) ≤ 1,
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SIGNER S(pp, pk, skt, t): USER U(pp, pk, t, µ) :
Phase 1: Phase 2:
01. Ft :=
[
A0‖A(t1)1 ‖ · · · ‖A(tℓ)ℓ
]
∈ Zn×(ℓ+1)mq 05. Ft :=
[
A0‖A(t1)1 ‖ · · · ‖A(tℓ)ℓ
]
02. St ∈ Z(ℓ+1)m×k ← SampleKey(Ft, TFt , σ,K) 06. a $←− D(ℓ+1)mσ3 , b $←− Dkσ1
(i.e., Ft · St = K (mod q)) 07. d′ $←− {0, 1}n, c := com(µ,d),
03. r ∈ Z(ℓ+1)m $←− D(ℓ+1)mσ2 , x = Ftr ∈ Znq u = Fta+ x+Kb (mod q)
04. Send x to the user 08. e′ = H(u,c) ∈ RkH , e := e′ + b
[Go to Phase 2] 09. Output e with probability
Phase 3: min
{
D
m
σ1
(e)
M1·D
m
σ1,e
′ (e)
, 1
}
11. z = r+ Ste 10. Send e back to the signer.
12. Output z with probability [Go to Phase 3]
min
{
D
(ℓ+1)m
σ2
(z)
M2·D
(ℓ+1)m
σ2,Ste
(z)
, 1
}
Phase 4:
13. Send z to the user 14. z′ = z+ a
[Go to Phase 4] 15. Output z′ with probability
Phase 5: min
{
D
(ℓ+1)m
σ3
(z′)
M3·D
(ℓ+1)m
σ3,z
(z′)
, 1
}
18. if (result 6= accept): i.e., if (‖z′‖ < σ3
√
(ℓ+ 1)m) :
19. Parse result := (a,b, e′, c) result := accept
20. u := Fta+ x+Kb (mod q) else: result := (a,b, e
′, c)
û := Fta+ Ftz−Ke′ (mod q) 16. Output: (t, µ, Σ = (d′, e′, z′))
21. if (e− b = e′ = H(u, c) or ⊥ when result 6= accept
and e′ = H(û, c) 17. Send result back to the signer.
and ‖z+ a ‖ ≥ σ3
√
(ℓ+ 1)m): [Go to Phase 5]
restart from Phase 1
22. Output: the view V = (t, r, e, z)
Fig. 2. The signing algorithm Sign(pp, pk, skt, t, µ)
meaning thatM ≥ e1+1/288. It is easy to see thatM ≈ e1+1/288 is the best choice.
Applying this observation to the rejection samplings in Phases 3 and 4, we see
that a valid signature can be successfully produced after at most M2 ·M3 ≈ e2
repetitions.
5.2 Blindness
Theorem 5 (Blindness). Let com be a statistically hiding commitment and H
be an one-way and collision-resistant hash function. Then, the proposed forward-
secure blind signature FSBS is blind.
Proof. In the blindness game BlindS
∗
FSBS, the adversarial signer S∗ gives the chal-
lenger C two messages µ0 and µ1. The challenger C chooses uniformly at random
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a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and interacts with S∗ in order to sign both messages µb and µ1−b.
C acts as two users Ub := U(pp, pk, t, µb) and U1−b := U(pp, pk, t, µ1−b). Finally,
S∗ gets two pairs (Vb, Σb) and (V1−b, Σ1−b) that correspond to the users Ub and
U1−b, respectively. We argue that the knowledge of (Vb, Σb) and (V1−b, Σ1−b)
is independent of the signed messages. In other words, S∗ cannot distinguish,
which user it is communicating with. In other words, it cannot guess b with
non-negligible probability.
Indeed, for Vb = (t, rb, eb, zb) and V1−b = (t, r1−b, e1−b, z1−b), we need to
consider the pair (eb, e1−b) only, since zb and z1−b are produced by S∗ itself. In
Phase 2, the rejection sampling makes sure that the distribution of both eb and
e1−b are the same, which is Dkσ1 . This means that eb and e1−b are independent of
the signed messages. Consider Σb = (d
′
b, e
′
b, z
′
b) and Σ1−b = (d
′
1−b, e
′
1−b, z
′
1−b).
As Phase 4 uses the rejection sampling, both z′b and z
′
1−b have the same distri-
bution, which is D(1+ℓ)mσ3 . It means that S∗ does not learn anything about the
signed messages from the knowledge of (d′b, d
′
1−b) and (e
′
b, e
′
1−b). This is true
because the former pair are randomly chosen and the latter pair are hash values
of the one-way and collision-resistant function H .
Finally, it is easy to see that restarts, which may happen in Phase 5, do not
increase advantage of S∗ in the blindness game. In fact, a restart occurs if the
user has sent result := (a,b, e′, c) to S∗. The values d′, a and b are freshly
sampled by the user. Additionally, as com is a statistically hiding commitment,
knowing c, S∗ cannot tell apart µb from µ1−b.
5.3 Forward-secure Unforgeability
We recall the following lemma, which we use to support our witness indistin-
guishability argument.
Lemma 6 (Adapted from [21, Lemma 5.2]). Given a matrix F ∈ Zn×(ℓ+1)mq ,
where (ℓ+1)m > 64+n log q/ log(2d+1) and s
$←− {−d, · · · , 0, · · · , d}(ℓ+1)m. Then
there exists another s′
$←− {−d, · · · , 0, · · · , d}(ℓ+1)m such that Fs = Fs′(mod q)
with probability at least 1− 2−100.
Note that Lemma 4 also gives the same conclusion as Lemma 6 but with the
not so clear condition d≫ q(ℓ+1)m/n.
Theorem 6 (Forward-secure Unforgeability). Suppose that the commit-
ment function com used in FSBS is computationally binding and that there exists
a forger A, who can break the forward-secure unforgeablity of FSBS. Then, one
can construct a polynomial-time algorithm B that solves an l2-SISq,n,(1+2ℓ)m,β
problem with β = max{(2σ3 + 2σ
√
κ)
√
(1 + ℓ)m, (2σ3 + σ2)
√
(1 + ℓ)m}.
Proof. The reduction is as follows:
Phase 0 (Instance). Assume that B wants to solve an instance of the SISq,n,(1+2ℓ)m,β
problem
F · v = 0 mod q, ‖v‖ ≤ β, F ∈ Zn×(1+2ℓ)mq , (1)
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in which F is parsed as F =
[
A0‖U (0)1 ‖U (1)1 ‖ · · · ‖U (0)ℓ ‖U (1)ℓ
]
with A
(k)
0 , U
(b)
i ∈
Z
n×m
q for β = max{(2σ3 + 2σ
√
κ)
√
(1 + ℓ)m, (2σ3 + σ2)
√
(1 + ℓ)m} and
b ∈ {0, 1}.
Phase 1 (Guessing the target). B guesses the target time period t∗ that A
wants to attack by choosing randomly t∗ = (t∗1, · · · , t∗ℓ )
$←− {0, · · · , τ − 1}.
The success probability of guessing t∗ is 1/τ .
Phase 2 (Initialize). B sets common parameters pp as in the Setup algorithm.
However, B sets the public key pk according to the following steps.
– For i ∈ [ℓ], B sets A(t∗i )i = U (t
∗
i )
i . For each bit b ∈ {0, 1} such that b 6= t∗i ,
B invokes TrapGen to generate A(b)i together with a short basis TA(b)i of
Λ⊥q (A
(b)
i ).
– B samples S∗ ← D(1+ℓ)m×kσ and sets K := Ft∗ · S∗, where Ft∗ =[
A0‖A(t
∗
1)
1 ‖ · · · ‖A(t
∗
ℓ )
ℓ
]
∈ Zn×(1+ℓ)mq . Let d := σ
√
(1 + ℓ)m. Then σ should
be chosen sufficiently large to satisfy Lemma 2 (i.e., σ ≥ ω(
√
log((1 + ℓ)m))),
Lemma 4 (i.e., d ≫ q(1+ℓ)m/n) and Lemma 6 (i.e., (1 + ℓ)m > 64 +
n log q/ log(2d+1)). Statement 1 of Theorem 2 gurantees that ‖S∗‖ ≤ d
with overwhelming probability. According Lemma 2, K is statistically
close to uniform.
– Finally, B sends pp, and pk ← {A0, A(0)1 , A(1)1 , · · · , A(0)ℓ , A(1)ℓ ,K} to A as
the common parameters and the public key, while keeping T
A
(b)
i
’s and
S∗ secret.
B creates and maintains a list LH consisting of random oracle queries (u, c) $←−
Z
n
q × {0, 1}n and their corresponding hash value e′ ∈ RH . In other words,
LH = {(u, c, e′) ∈ Znq × {0, 1}n × RH : e′ = H(u, c)}. In addition, B also
prepares the set of replies for qH hash queries R := {r1, · · · , rqH}, where
each ri
$←− RH . It then chooses a random tape ρ and runs A on (pp, pk, ρ)
in a black-box manner.
Phase 3 (Queries). B plays the role of signer and interacts with A. B responds
to A queries as follows:
– Key update queries KQ(t), t = (t1, · · · , tℓ): If t ≤ t∗, B aborts the query.
Otherwise, let k ≤ ℓ be the minimum index such that tk 6= t∗k. Then, the
adversary B first uses the trapdoor T
A
(tk)
k
to compute the key Ttk for the
node tk
Ttk ← ExtBasis(E‖A(tk)k , TA(tk)k ), where E =
[
A0‖A(t1)1 ‖ · · · ‖A(tk−1)k−1
]
,
from which B computes all keys in skt as in the real key update algorithm.
– Hash queries HQ(u, c): Having received a hash query (u, c), B checks if
the list LH contains the query. If B finds out that (u, c) is in LH already,
then B sends the corresponding hash value e′ to the forger A. Otherwise,
B chooses the first unused ri, i ∈ [qH ] from R, takes e′ := ri and stores
the query-hash value pair ((u, c), e′) in LH . Finally, B sends e′ to the
forger A as the answer.
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– Signing queries SQ(t, µ): B constructs Ft :=
[
A
(k0)
0 ‖A(t1)1 ‖ · · · ‖A(tℓ)ℓ
]
and checks if t 6= t∗ or not. If t 6= t∗, B computes TFt ← ExtBasis(Ft, TA(tk)k ),
and St ← SampleKey(Ft, TFt , σ,K), where k ≤ ℓ is the minimum index
such that tk 6= t∗k. Note that Ft · St = K. Otherwise, if t = t∗, B simply
assigns St∗ ← S∗ since Ft∗ · S∗ = K.
– Break-in queries BQ(t): Once the adversary A makes a query BQ(t), if
t ≤ t∗, then B aborts. Otherwise, i.e., t > t∗, B decides that the break-in
time is t← t. B answers to A by sending the secret key skt in the same
way as replying to the key update queries since t = t > t∗.
Phase 4 (Forge). Eventually, A outputs a forgery (t′1, µ∗1, Σ∗1 ). B checks if
t′1 = t
∗ or not. If not, then B aborts. Otherwise, B accepts the forgery. For
the forgery (t∗, µ∗1, Σ
∗
1 ), we have: (i) Σ
∗
1 = (d
′
1, e
′
1, z
′
1); (ii) e
′
1 := H(Ft∗z
′
1 −
Ke′1 mod q, com(µ
∗
1,d
′
1)), where Ft∗ :=
[
A0‖A(t
∗
1)
1 ‖ · · · ‖A(t
∗
ℓ )
ℓ
]
∈ Zn×(1+ℓ)m;
and (iii) ‖z′1‖ ≤ σ3
√
(1 + ℓ)m.
Analysis. We argue that the simulation of B is statistically perfect. In other
words, the forger A is not able to distinguish the simulator B from the real
challenger in the FSEU game. Indeed, the simulation proceeds as the real game
except the following exceptions.
(i) Some matrices A
(b)
i are not really random but is generated by TrapGen. How-
ever, Theorem 1 ensures that the distribution of A
(b)
i generated by TrapGen
is close to uniform.
(ii) The matrix K is not randomly chosen. It is obtained by sampling S∗ from
D(1+ℓ)m×mσ and then assigning K := F · S∗. Lemma 2 asserts that selection
of K is close to uniform. Note that the sufficiently large choice of σ does not
affect (iii).
(iii) The matrix St∗ is equal to S
∗, which is not computed using SampleKey.
The forger A does not know St so consequently does not know S∗. As z is
generated (in Step 12) using the rejection sampling, we always guarantee
that z← D(ℓ+1)mσ2 and z is independent of St and S∗. Thus the view of A is
independent of S∗.
Now, we show how to obtain the solution to the l2-SIS problem given by Equation
(1). Let i ∈ [qH ] be the target forking index, for which e′1 = ri. B follows the
rewinding strategy by keeping {r1, · · · , ri−1} and sampling new fresh answers
{r′i, · · · , r′qH}
$←− RH . Now, B uses R′ := {r1, · · · , ri−1, r′i, · · · , r′qH} to answer
to A’s hash queries.
The forking lemma [23, Lemma 4] asserts that A outputs a new signature
(t′2, µ
∗
2, Σ
∗
2), where Σ
∗
2 = (d
′
2, e
′
2, z
′
2) such that e
′
2 = r
′
i using the same hash query
as in the first run (i.e., the i-th hash query). Recall that γ is the probability of
a restart of FSBS. As before, if t′2 6= t∗, then B aborts. If e′2 = e′1, B aborts
and replays A(pp, pk, ρ′) at most qqSH times using different random tapes ρ′ and
different hash queries. If e′2 6= e′1, then B returns
((Ft∗z
′
1 −Ke′1, com(µ∗1,d′1)), (Ft∗z′2 −Ke′2, com(µ∗2,d′2)). (2)
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Since the pair in Equation (2) are both coming from the same hash query and
com is computationally binding, we have µ∗2 = µ
∗
1, d
′
1 = d
′
2 and
Ft∗z
′
1 −Ke′1 = Ft∗z′2 −Ke′2 (mod q),
or equivalently,
Ft∗(z
′
1 − z′2 − S∗(e′1 − e′2)) = 0 (mod q).
Set v̂ := z′1 − z′2 − S∗(e′1 − e′2). By Lemmas 4 and 6, there is at least one
secret key S′ such that Ft∗S
∗ = Ft∗S
′ (mod q), where S∗ and S′ have all the
same columns except the i-th column. The index i shows the position, where
e′1[i] 6= e′2[i]. If z′1 − z′2 − S∗(e′1 − e′2) = 0, then we can choose v̂ := z′1 −
z′2 − S′(e′1 − e′2) 6= 0. Stress that the view of A is independent of both S∗ and
S′. We have shown that v̂ 6= 0 and Ft∗ · v̂ = 0 (mod q). It is easy to see that
‖v̂‖ ≤ 2(σ3 + σ
√
κ)
√
(1 + ℓ)m, as ‖S∗‖ ≤ σ
√
(1 + ℓ)m, ‖z′i‖ ≤ σ3
√
(ℓ+ 1)m,
and ‖e′i‖ ≤
√
κ for i ∈ {1, 2}.
In particular, we show that if A can produce a forgery by restarting the
signing interaction (with B), then B is able to find a solution to the l2-SIS
problem given by Equation (1). Indeed, to restart the signing interaction, A
delivers result:= (a,b, e′, c) to B. Now B with its view V = (t, r, e, z), will check
whether all
e− b = e′ = H(x+ Ft∗a+Kb (mod q), c), (3)
e′ = H(Ft∗a+ Ft∗z−Ke′ (mod q), c), (4)
‖z+ a‖ > σ3
√
(1 + ℓ)m. (5)
hold or not. If all are satisfied, B restarts the interaction with A. Let assume
that afterwards A successfully produces a valid signature Σ̂ = (d̂′, ê′, ẑ′). Let
b̂ ∈ Dmσ1 be such that e = ê′ + b̂. Then, the following relations have to hold
e− b̂ = ê′ = H(x+ Ft∗a+Kb̂ (mod q), c), (6)
ê′ = H(Ft∗ ẑ
′ −Kê′ (mod q), com(µ∗, d̂′)), (7)
‖ẑ′‖ ≤ σ3
√
(1 + ℓ)m. (8)
Now, if ê′ 6= e′, then B aborts. Otherwise, Equations (4) and (7) give Ft∗a +
Ft∗z (mod q) = Ft∗ ẑ
′ (mod q). Let v̂ := a + z − ẑ′, then v̂ 6= 0. This is true as
otherwise a + z = ẑ′, which implies that ‖z + a‖ ≤ ησ3
√
m (by Equation (8)).
This contradicts Equation (5). Again, we have Ft∗ · v̂ = 0 (mod q), v̂ 6= 0 and
‖v̂‖ ≤ ‖a‖+ ‖z‖+ ‖ẑ′‖ ≤ (2σ3 + σ2)
√
(1 + ℓ)m.
Note that Ft∗ =
[
A0‖A(t
∗
1)
1 ‖ · · · ‖A(t
∗
ℓ )
ℓ
]
=
[
A0‖U (t
∗
1)
1 ‖ · · · ‖U (t
∗
ℓ )
ℓ
]
. We can
get F from Ft∗ by inserting into the gap between two sub-matrices in Ft∗ the
remaining matrices {U (1−t∗i )i }i at relevant positions. We insert zeros into the
corresponding position of v̂ to get the desired solution v to the problem given
by Equation (1). Obviously, F · v = 0 (mod q), and ‖v‖ = ‖v̂‖.
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Parameters Value Usage
n – Security parameter
ℓ – Binary tree depth
τ 2ℓ #time points
β
β = max{(2σ3 + 2σ√κ)
√
(1 + ℓ)m,
(2σ3 + σ2)
√
(1 + ℓ)m} For l2-SISq,n,(1+2ℓ)m,β
to be hard, Theorem 3
q q ≥ β · ω(√n log n), prime
m
max{ 1
1+ℓ
· (64 + n log q
log(2d+1)
), ⌈6n log q⌉},
d = σ ·
√
(1 + ℓ)m
Lemma 6, TrapGen
σ ≥ O(√n log q) · ω(√log n) SampleKey, Theorem 2
M1,M2,M3 M1 =M2 =M3 = e
1+1/288
Rejection sampling
σ1 12
√
κ
σ2 12σησ1
√
(1 + ℓ)mk
σ3 12ησ2
√
m
k, κ 2κ · (k
κ
) ≥ 2γ Min-entropy of the hash
function H at least γ
Table 1. Choosing parameters for the proposed FSBS scheme
To summarise, we have shown that B can solve the l2-SISq,n,(1+2ℓ)m,β prob-
lem, with
β = max{(2σ3 + 2σ
√
κ)
√
(1 + ℓ)m, (2σ3 + σ2)
√
(1 + ℓ)m}.
Remark 2. In the proof for the forward-secure unforgeability, one may think of
the method of programming hash values, instead of using the real signing inter-
action (with a modification in generating the matrix St to compute z = r+Ste)
in order to reply signing queries issued by A. We argue that the programming
method fails to simulate the perfect environment for the adversary A. Assume
that B does not want to compute St in the way we have done in our proof.
Then, after replying to a hash query, say (x + Fta + Kb (mod q), com(µ,d
′)),
by giving a hash value, say e′, B simply chooses z ← D(ℓ+1)mσ2 and then sends
z to A. In turn, A gives e := e′ + b to B. After that B sets H(Fta + Ftz −
Ke′, com(µ,d′)) := e′. However, since the collision resistance of H , the relation
Fta+ Ftz−Ke′ = x+ Fta+Kb (mod q) has to hold. Thus, A needs to check
whether or not Ftz = x +Ke (mod q) to distinguish the simulated signing in-
teraction from the real one. One may think that B can choose z ← D(ℓ+1)mσ2
such that Ftz = x +Ke (mod q) before sending z to A. However, without the
knowledge of a trapdoor for Ft, the problem of choosing such a z is not easy.
5.4 Choosing Parameters
First, we set n as security parameter, ℓ as the highest depth of the binary tree
representing time points, τ = 2ℓ as the number of time points. For TrapGen,
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we need m ≥ ⌈6n log q⌉. For SampleKey (Theorem 2) to work, we need σ ≥
O(
√
n log q) · ω(√log n). Also, let d := σ
√
(1 + ℓ)m and we set (ℓ + 1)m ≥
64 + n log q/ log(2d + 1) via Lemma 6. To make sure the min-entropy of H is
at least γ, we choose k and κ such that 2κ · (kκ) ≥ 2γ . Section 5.1 suggests
setting Mi := e
1+1/288 for all i ∈ [3]. We then set σ1 = 12‖e′‖ = 12
√
κ, σ2 =
12‖S∗e‖ = 12σσ1
√
(1 + ℓ)mk and σ3 = 12‖z‖ = 12ησ2
√
(1 + ℓ)m (via Remark
1). For l2-SISq,n,(1+ℓ)m,β to be hard by Theorem 3, we set m poly-bounded, β =
poly(n) and q ≥ β ·ω(√n logn), where β = max{(2σ3+2σ
√
κ)
√
(1 + ℓ)m, (2σ3+
σ2)
√
(1 + ℓ)m}. The parameter setting is summarized in Table 1.
6 Conclusions and Future Works
In this paper, we propose, for the first time, a forward-secure blind signature
based on the hardness of the SIS problem in lattices. Using the rejection sampling
technique together with the trapdoor delegation and the binary tree structure
for representing of time periods, the proposed signature is blind and forward
secure. Forward security is proven in the random oracle setting. Lattice-based
forward-secure blind signatures in the standard model should be an interesting
topic for future research.
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